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Abstract
Digital evidence is now common in legal cases, but the understanding of the legal fraternity as to how far
conventional ideas of evidence can be extended into the digital domain lags behind. Evidence determines the
truth of an issue but its weight is subject to examination and verification through existing forms of legal
argument. There is a need for a practical ‘roadmap’ that can guide the legal practitioner in identifying digital
evidence relevant to support a case and in assessing its weight. A vital, but sometimes under estimated stage is
that of validating the evidence before evaluating its weight. In this paper we describe a process by which the
validation of relevant evidence required for legal argument can be facilitated, by an interrogative approach that
ensures the chain of reasoning is sustained.
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INTRODUCTION
In this paper we examine the investigative and legal processes involved in preparing digital evidence for use in
legal argument and suggest that evidence taken at face value may be injudicious unless its validity is established
before it can be used. Validation requires confidence about inferences drawn from the evidence - can that
evidence be relied upon in a legal argument? Validating digital evidence requires verification of relevant parts
of the digital domain where the evidence is created, processed and transferred, including the evidence file itself,
application and operating programmes and the hardware platform. While techniques of digital forensics aid in
preserving and locating potential evidence from a crime scene, the extent to which this may be trusted and used
as evidence in a particular legal argument still needs to be determined. We suggest that validation of digital
evidence, a difficult task for the investigator, poses an even greater challenge to legal practitioners when
constructing legal arguments. Legal practitioners may be unaware of the full nature and significance of digital
evidence that is more technically complex compared to conventional forms of evidence.
In the past courts may have been inclined to accept the weight of digital evidence based on expediency and
intuition, or if confused by technical issues have dismissed the case out of hand; however, there is the likelihood
of increased legal challenges that cast doubt on the weight of the evidence in the future (Ahmad, 2002, Pospesel,
Howard, & Rodes, 1997, Schneier, 2000, Whitman, 2005, Tapper, 2004, Whitcomb, 2002). This is evident by
the growth in computer-based crime that has increased reliance on digital evidence, both as partial evidence in
otherwise conventional legal cases, or where the evidence exists entirely in digital form (Etter, 2001a,
Thompson & Berwick, 1998, Palmer, 2001, Cohen, 2006). Digital evidence exists in complex technical
environments, unfamiliar territory for most legal practitioners who have difficulty determining how far
conventional ideas of evidence can be extended into the digital domain (Etter, 2001b, Losavio, Adams &
Rogers, 2006, Caloyannides, 2001, Edwards, 2005).
Evidence used in legal cases proves facts that are in dispute and the weight that may be attached to the facts is
examined and tested by various forms of legal argument (Anderson & Twining, 1991, Tapper, 2004). Legal
argument can be a complex, convoluted process taking in a broad range of evidentiary issues; technically

complex digital evidence used in constructing compelling legal arguments makes the process significantly more
challenging for the legal practitioner (Caloyannides, 2001, p. 3, Tapper, 2004, pp. 30-31, Mohay, 2003, Wall &
Paroff, 2004, Yasinsac, Erbacher, Marks, Pollitt & Sommer, 2003). Few legal practitioners have sufficient
technical expertise to analyse digital evidence in case preparation and is difficult for them to present it in simple
comprehensible terms to judges and juries; what may seem a potentially successful case based on
straightforward legal argument can turn a into a needless failure (Yasinsac et al, 2003). Moreover, developing
legal arguments can be frustrated if unskilled use is made of the digital evidence, with unanticipated and often
detrimental outcomes. For example, when presenting a legal case based on what appears to be convincing
digital evidence, the case can collapse if the defence can show that the security integrity of the network is
defective and shows contamination or alteration of the digital evidence it is supposed to protect. Consequently,
if the validity of the evidence can be established its weight in legal argument is enhanced; however if its validity
is uncertain or invalidated then weight of the evidence is diminished or negated.

THE INVESTIGATIVE AND LEGAL DOMAINS
Figure 1 highlights the processing of digital evidence in the investigative and legal domains. The investigation
domain consists of the stages taken by investigators in evidence preservation, location, selection and validation
that precede the stages in the legal domain that involve legal practitioners constructing and then presenting legal
arguments. This paper focuses on the validation stage, at the interface between the location and selection of
evidence by the investigator and its subsequent use by the legal practitioner. We examine the challenges
presented to the legal practitioner on receipt of digital evidence and describe a process by which they may assess
the validity of the evidence within the context of their argument.
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Figure 1. Evidence processing stages in the investigative and legal domains

The stages of the investigation stage shown in Figure 1 commence with the evidence preservation stage that
recognises the fragility of digital evidence. Digital evidence can easily be altered, damaged, or destroyed by
improper handling or improper examination and so the preservation stage attempts to stabilise and isolate the
evidence scene to prevent contamination that damages its admissibility and weight (Ashcroft, 2001, Carrier &
Spafford, 2003). The location stage involves locating and identifying the digital evidence for the given class of
crime or violation that supports or refutes hypotheses about the incident, using various technical tools and
investigative processes to accomplish this (Carrier et al, 2003). During the evidence selection stage the
investigator scrutinises the evidence to determine what events occurred in the system and their significance and
probative value to the case (Carrier et al, 2003).
During the validation stage the evidence is tested to determine its validity, namely if the assertion drawn from
the digital evidence can be verified. For example, the assertion that an email message was deleted would require
confirmation of the existence of the deleted file; that it was deleted at a specific time; that this information was
not altered by system processes; and so forth. Whatever security measures exist on the host computer they are
not always helpful to the investigator as they are more often intended for auditing and monitoring of the overall
integrity of records rather than for specifically validating digital evidence (Carrier, 2005a). During the
validation stage the investigator may revisit the location and selection stages to seek verification of validity
issues and to develop new lines of investigation as circumstances dictate (Carrier et al, 2003).
Inordinate amounts of time and resources are required to collect and analyse digital evidence and the sheer
volume of the cases and the time required to process them can have a negative effect on the capacity of
investigators - and later legal practitioners - to analyse and present a complete reconstruction of the evidence (Ó
Ciardhuáin, 2004). Failure to locate all available digital evidence occurs because the location of relevant
evidence is not always evident to the untrained enquirer who may be relying solely on intuition (Cohen, 2006).
While a technically astute and assiduous investigator can identify and analyse much relevant evidence, time
constraints and the uniqueness of the crime scene may nevertheless produce incomplete identification of all that
should be located, consequently denying examination and analysis of crucial facts (unamed, 2000). Incomplete
scrutiny of the available evidence during the validation stage of the investigative process and failure to validate
the evidence at that point is where the investigation can fail (Cohen, 2006). Carrier (2005a) points out that
whatever security measures are used, they are more often used to assist in the auditing and monitoring of the
overall integrity of records rather than directly evaluating the evidentiary integrity of digital information.
False evidence too can be generated upon which unreliable arguments are propounded by those unfamiliar with
the true nature of the digital domain (Koehler & Thompson, 2006, Diaconis, 1989). Koehler et al (2006)
caution against endeavours to locate circumstantial evidence that seem to support reasonable and compelling
argument may well be unreliable because they are purely coincidental and nothing more. Moreover,
investigators may miss evidence and worse still, resort to ‘cherry-picking’ when choosing or omitting evidence
to gain legal advantage: the absence of evidence does not necessarily show evidence of absence - a common
phenomenon of the digital domain (Koehler et al, 2006, Berk, 1983, Flusche, 2001).
There is error in every analysis method and the reliability of any particular test remains an issue for forensic
investigators (Palmer, 2002, Cohen, 2006). A range of different factors can affect the validity of the evidence,
including collection tools missing, failure to report exculpatory data, evidence taken out of context and
misinterpreted, misleading or false evidence, failure to identify relevant evidence, system and application
processing errors, and so forth (Palmer, 2002, Cohen, 2006). Because of the complexity of the digital domain
prosecution cases often fail during trial where incompetency is apparent in reconstructing the case and where
validation issues are raised (Cohen, 2006). The evidence collated and processed during the investigative stages
is then presented to the legal practitioner who must test each piece of evidence to determine its weight in the
legal argument and its suitability for use to prove or disprove the case (Ashley & Rissland, 1985, Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). A more explicitly defined and repeatable process would be useful for the legal
practitioner who may then have more confidence in the evidence derived during the validation stage.
Research to date has focussed on providing investigators with the means to preserve, locate and select digital
evidence (Daum & Lucks, 2005, Lenstraand & de Weger, 2005, Schneier, 2004). For the legal practitioner, the
research has attempted to enhance analysis of the weight of evidence as part of structuring legal arguments, but
with limited adoption of such processes (Tillers, 2005). Computer and network security and digital forensics
research provides documentation about the properties of digital evidence but it does not explain in a legal
context helpful to the legal practitioner (Spenceley, 2003, Mohay, 2003). The validation of the evidence,
however, is largely dependant on the skill and knowledge of investigators.

There is some ongoing legal debate calling for a replacement of conventional forensic identification science that
relies on untested assumptions and intuition - including digital forensics - with sounder scientific analysis (Saks
& Koehler, 2005, Tobin & Thompson, 2006, Mohay, 2003). Most writings on the examination and analysis of
digital evidence focus on the preservation of evidence and the chain of evidence, with scant mention of the
properties of the evidence itself, which may reflect the comparatively recent emergence of digital evidence and
cyber forensics (Slade, 2004, Mohay, 2003). Compounding this deficiency is the inefficacy of conventional
security processes to preserve digital evidence, for that is not their intended role (Caloyannides, 2001,
Rowlingson, 2004, p. 2). Such processes are more often used as forensic tools to investigate a compromise of
record integrity or as part of data recovery processes but do go some way towards identifying the evidence and
reconstructing a timeline of events (Carrier, 2005a, Egan & Mather, 2004). However, a lack of recognition and
acknowledgement by designers, owners and custodians of digital information as to its potential evidentiary
importance means that computer system designs fall short of protecting evidence, sometimes preventing it being
used as key exhibits (Rowlingson, 2004, p. 2).
Figure 2 lists broad areas of research and practice reported in the literature, highlighting the deficit in the area of
validating digital evidence.
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Figure 2. The gap in the research and practice reported in the literature.
Research and practice in the new field of cyber forensics is late in offering practical pedagogical models, leaving
investigators to rely solely on their investigative skills and technical knowledge (Yasinsac at al, 2003). For the
legal practitioner without firsthand technical skills, some form of practical ‘roadmap’ is needed that can prompt
him or her to identify all pertinent digital evidence relevant to a case and help assess the weight of the evidence
more effectively. Research attempts to help legal practitioners through such processes as computer-assisted

analysis of legal arguments based on evidence reconstruction, and theories including probability theory and
inferential analysis (Silverstone & Sheetz, 2007, Huygen, 2002). To date, however, attempts to present the
inference processes in diagrammatic form has tended to confuse the legal practitioner rather than promoting a
better understanding of the dynamics of digital evidence (Tillers, 2005).
In criminal cases the prosecution, usually a law enforcement agency, has the advantage of government
investigators with experience and resources; resources not always available or affordable to the defence: the
defence team relies on an outline of the prosecution’s case and forensic evidence images so that it can prepare a
defence (Mercuri, 2005). Even with some technical help, the defence team may have little understanding of the
properties of digital evidence and may not have clear understanding of the relationship between key digital
evidence and potential corroborating evidence that could be used to its advantage in developing legal counterarguments. In civil cases, there may be a more equitable allocation of technical expertise; nonetheless, the legal
practitioners would still need additional help with the complexity of digital evidence. An experienced
investigator would be unwise to ‘second guess’ the legal practitioner but may have difficulty explaining the
significance and relationship of the various pieces of evidence. The legal practitioner may take the evidence at
face value but suffer its eventual overturn by a more technically astute legal opponent. It is during this
validation stage that we believe the legal practitioner needs some prompting to minimise this risk.
In this paper, we are concerned specifically with the validation of the evidence, rather than the subsequent
process of interpretation. We describe a process of methodical interrogation of the digital evidence that
establishes whether it is valid and therefore suitable for use in legal arguments. The process we propose also
offers relevant prompts guiding the legal practitioner to supplementary evidence that may corroborate, negate or
offer alternative hypotheses about the validity of the evidence.

THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE AND LEGAL ARGUMENT
Evidence used in legal cases may consist of witness testimony, hearsay, documents and things, and proves facts
that are in dispute through directly proving the ultimate fact without relying on other evidence to prove any
intervening, penultimate steps (Anderson & Twining, 1991, Tapper, 2004). Evidence is also used to prove the
plausibility of facts from which facts that are being disputed, may be understood - most notably, circumstantial
evidence (Tapper, 2004). Digital evidence shares many common features with conventional forms of evidence
yet it is its technical properties that tend to confound the legal practitioner.
The nature of digital evidence
Although electronic evidence is defined as information of investigative value relating to a broad range of
devices and data formats (Ashcroft, 2001), a formal legal definition of digital evidence is elusive, but is
generally accepted to be information held in digital form that has some probative value (Carrier et al, 2005b,
Pollitt, 2001). Digital evidence typical sought in legal cases includes system logs, audit logs, application logs,
network management logs, network traffic capture, and file system data (Sommer, 1998).
Digital evidence is often considered superior to conventional paper evidence being easier to locate and process,
and also contains useful data containing details of key dates, times and a history of the file, and, because of its
persistency in recording key data, can provide evidence that a defendant may prefer not to exist (Caloyannides,
2001, Janes, 2000). Digital evidence tends to provide metadata about itself prior to the fact, more so than
paper-based evidence, and this can provide valuable information relating to a crime such as linking a defendant
to an offence and showing evidence of intent, ability and opportunity leading up to the commission of the crime
(Janes, 2000, Flusche, 2001).
Several authors contend that digital evidence is not fundamentally different from conventional forms of
evidence but is problematic because of its volatility, the complexity of the digital domain, large datasets, and
rapid changes to technology that require current technical understanding that is certainly beyond the capability
of most legal practitioners (Sommer, 2000, Mercuri, 2005).
Other authors point out that there seems little difference between digital evidence and physical evidence as both
forms are required to establish the commission of an offence and link the crime and the victim, or provide a link
between the offence and the perpetrator (Carrier et al, 2003, Saferstein, 2000). Similarly, in the digital domain
there is much merit in using conventional, crime scene investigation techniques; again showing a degree of
fundamental similarity between the domains. Carrier et al (2003) provide helpful definitions to put this in better

perspective by suggesting that the computer, computer hardware and peripherals are physical evidence, while
the data in memory held in these devices is digital evidence.
Circumstantial evidence, which includes digital evidence, is used to construct inferences that indirectly prove
the ultimate fact in a legal case (Anderson, 1991) but before it may be admitted or given any credence in legal
cases, it must meet additional legal conditions and conform to courtroom conventions (Caloyannides, 2001, p. 3,
Tapper, 2004, pp. 30-31). Circumstantial evidence is probabilistic in nature, often challenging and confounding
observers attempting to determine the truth of an issue because the examination processes used are poorly
defined (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson & Kunda, 1983, Nisbett & Ross., 1980). Digital
evidence is analogous to the more conventional forms of circumstantial evidence, most notably documentary
evidence, and both forms are subject to the same degree of legal scrutiny afforded to direct evidence tendered by
a human witness (Caloyannides, 2001, p. 3, Tapper, 2004, pp. 30-31).
Inherent differences between digital and conventional evidence exist as digital evidence is more easily altered
than conventional forms and such manipulation is sometimes not evident or even possible to detect
(Caloyannides, 2001). Digital evidence is mutable – it may be altered far more easily than physical records –
and consequently is more susceptible to unauthorised manipulation, making it problematic to validate its
admissibility and weight (Schneier, 2000, Mattord & Whitman, 2004, Akester, 2004).
Inaccuracies in attribution of authorship and the content of digital evidence occur frequently and affect legal
argument as to the completeness, correctness, validity and faithfulness to an original source, thereby raising
doubts as to the worth of the evidence (Akester, 2004, p. 436). More disturbing is that even in the absence of
any obvious irregularity of the software platforms examination of any material of evidentiary value does not in
itself attest to the accuracy or integrity of the evidence (Spenceley, 2003, pp. 130-131). The more pessimistic
argue that it cannot be assumed that there is a low risk of inaccuracy in computer output due to application
failures (Spenceley, 2003, pp. 130-131).

Representing legal argument
Legal argument relies on evidence that proves or disproves a case; based on the available evidence the defendant
is guilty or innocent of a crime. Legal practitioners use logical chains of inferences linking one piece of
evidence to another with the strength of each inference used to determine the weight of a case (Silverstone et al,
2007). The persuasiveness that flows from the combined evidence presented in a legal case is used to enable
adjudicators and juries establish proof of guilt or innocence of the accused party (Silverstone et al, 2007).
Further discussion of legal argument and its forms is beyond the scope of this paper.
Legal arguments are based on logical probabilities that collectively prove the case and are constructed from the
simplest logic possible and may be mapped, for example by a timeline of reconstructed events, or through
inferential analysis processes (Silverstone et al, 2007). The use of such processes displayed in graphic form
makes the evidence collected more readily comprehensible with relevant evidence arranged as coherent discreet
lines leading to the ultimate probandum.
It is unusual for legal cases to rely solely on circumstantial evidence; direct evidence such as witness testimony
may corroborate, refute or obfuscate whether the defendant accessed the computer, etc. Therefore, an inferential
analysis should include wherever possible evidence of direct evidence, physical evidence such as a fingerprint
linking the defendant to the computer as well as the digital evidence. Locating this supplementary evidence,
often intuition-based, helps develop argument and strengthen the overall weigh of available evidence. The
weight of the evidence depends on the various relationships between penultimate probanda and the reliability of
each probanda (Silverstone et al, 2007).
Figure 3 shows a simple chain of evidence based on apparent or available evidence consisting of unprocessed
facts from which tentative legal argument can be constructed.
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Figure 3. Chain of Evidence: Before validation of the evidence
This amount of preliminary evidence is readily comprehensible to legal practitioners but is most likely
incomplete. While experienced investigators may identify the less than obvious leads or seek expert advice
where their technical expertise fails, explaining the complexity of the digital evidence located to the legal
practitioner may be difficult. If the investigator is diligent, has sufficient technical and investigative expertise
and skills, and is dedicated to seeking all relevant evidence then the legal practitioner will be well served. But
the legal practitioner must be able to determine whether enough evidence has been located and whether the
validity of the digital of evidence has been satisfactorily described and determined.

A PROCESS FOR VALIDATION OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE
The interrogation process
Figure 4 outlines the basic validation interrogation process where exhibit B, taken from the chain of evidence
example in Figure 3 requires validation.
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Figure 4. Chain of Evidence: Showing the validation process of digital evidence exhibit “B”.
A series of prompts determines if the evidence is valid. Each prompt requires a response of ‘yes’ (the evidence
can be considered valid), ‘no’ (the evidence is invalid) or ‘unclear’, (suggesting that further explanation should
be considered). The “yes” and “no” outcomes are considered definitive, the “yes” indicating that the evidence
can be retained and a “no” indicating that the evidence should be rejected. An “unclear” result is inconclusive
and requires a further explanation to provide clarification to establish if the evidence is valid. Where further
explanation continues to be inconclusive, a decision to terminate the process is required and at that point, the
expertise of the legal practitioner will be required to retain or to reject the evidence based on the available
validation evidence.
Each piece of digital evidence considered for inclusion in legal argument is judged on the weight of inference of
at least one assertion used, for example, whether the existence of the deleted email file does infer the view that

there was an attempt to conceal evidence. In other words, an assertion claims deliberate deletion of the email
file with intent to remove all trace of the evidence. As evidence-based assertions are contestable, it is critical to
establish their validity.
Figure 5 shows a graphic decomposition of assertions provided by a digital evidence exhibit and the systematic
process required to determine its validity. Each assertion is evaluated to determine whether it is confirmed or
negated by other available evidence. Each circle in Figure 5 represents an assertion underpinning the evidence,
for instance “the defendant accessed a file on a computer”. The primary assertion 1 requires confirmation or
negation, provided by the secondary assertions 2 and 3. For example “the deleted email file existed” requires
validation. The file metadata may or may not confirm the assertion and the assertion the metadata provides may
itself need further confirmation by other assertions and so forth until the interrogation is considered sufficiently
strong to support the primary assertion.
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Figure 5. Decomposition of the evidence through validation process
Figure 6 shows an example of a chain of evidence where the evidence has been validated.
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Figure 6. Chain of evidence: After validation of digital evidence exhibit “B” is achieved.
Conversely, the primary assertion may be negated from the outset or at a later point, breaking the chain of
evidence as shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Chain of evidence: After validation of digital evidence exhibit “B” is negated.

Example
We present a hypothetical case to demonstrate the validation process. Consider a case involving a defendant
accessing a computer and sending a threatening email to another party, then deleting the email in an attempt to
conceal the evidence on the computer. A neighbour witnessed the defendant inside the room at the time of the
suspected offence, and police recovered the defendant’s and other persons’ fingerprints from the computer
keyboard, as shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 8. Hypothetical case showing digital, human and physical evidence
If we look at one piece of the evidence, that the file was deleted, it would be prudent to find out the processes
involved and whether it was possible to link the date and time of the deletion to the defendant’s known presence
in the room. In our hypothetical example, we seek explanations about key properties of the file evidence. We
need to find out the nature of the pertinent evidence, in this case the email application properties and from that,
attempt to validate the date and time of the file deletion, and then view the outcomes of that examination.

If we decompose the hypothetical case, it shows that the validation of the evidence can be a lengthy and
complex process. In Figure 9 we examine the deleted file and drill down through each sub-set of evidence that
provides assertions attesting to the validity of the evidence at the higher level. We expect to reach a conclusion
that is acceptable in the legal practitioner’s opinion as validation of the primary assertion corroborated by
supporting evidence.
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Figure 9. Hypothetical case decomposition showing the validation of assertions
Figure 10 shows an alternative path in which the decomposition established that the evidence was invalid
through the absence of corroborating evidence at the fourth secondary assertion.
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Figure10. Hypothetical case decomposition showing the invalidation of assertions
Figure 11 shows an alternative scenario where an anomaly existed about the validity of email file metadata
matching the time of the suspected deletion. This required further explanation confirming modification of the
metadata by virus scanning activity.
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Figure 11. Hypothetical case decomposition showing the validation of assertions by drilling
down through negative assertions
Further explanation showed that the virus scanning activity did not alter the actual date and time of deletion of
the email file and thus validity is sustained. This scenario emphasises the importance of searching for evidence
that negates an assertion as well as seeking confirmation.
Although potentially many questions about the evidence exist in our hypothetical and relatively simple example,
the number of questions may increase exponentially in complex cases. The process of decomposing the
original hypothetical evidence uncovered additional evidence clarifying the truth of the original bland assertion
about the file deletion. While this was a positive outcome, one path of validation did identify a negative
assertion but this was later nullified by other evidence, thus demonstrating the complexity of the digital domain.
Using the decomposition of the simulated result in Figure 11 the chain of evidence gained more pieces of
validated evidence to replace the simple assertion that a deleted file existed. The decomposition ended with the
assertion confirming the validity of the creation date of the deleted file and for the sake of brevity, we have not
decomposed the process further. So, accepting the new evidence, the chain of evidence may be modified with
validated evidence that is also more complete as shown in Figure 12.
The validation process described has identified a possible weakness in the evidence regarding a critical time, the
date and time of the file deletion. It is an important part of the legal argument to be able to state categorically
the exact time of deletion, but future counter-argument can be dispelled because it can be shown that only partial
modification occurred which does not weaken the assertion about the deletion time. The process has validated
the evidence providing clarification that allows the legal practitioner to gain a far greater understanding of the
strengths and weaknesses of the evidence available.
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Figure 12. Hypothetical case: modified chain of evidence after validation
The search for validation shown in the hypothetical example assumes that the enquirer has both investigative
and technical skills but the legal practitioner may be unable to know what questions to ask to test the validity of
the evidence. In the next section we describe how we may assist the legal practitioner in seeking relevant
information by providing prompts at each step of the process.

An interrogation checklist
To assist the legal practitioner, it is useful as part of the validation interrogation process to provide prompts that
firstly provide explanation about the properties of digital evidence, and secondly alert the legal practitioner
when further validation of the digital evidence is prudent. Providing an interrogation checklist of digital
evidence properties that offers a suite of prompts would enable the legal practitioner to make more discerning
judgement on the weight of evidence knowing that is has been validated or invalidated, or needs more research
to a point of reasonable termination of endeavour.
An interrogation checklist, which supplements the validation interrogation process, supplies prompts to direct
enquiry to seek facts confirming or negating the validity of the evidence. The enquirer has two options, to seek
confirmation of validity or to seek negation. These two options offer separate search patterns for the legal
practitioner who may seek validation of incriminating evidence, or wishes to develop an alternative hypothesis
as part of a counter-argument. We suggest that this system has the advantage of being more inclusive because it
would cover a broader range of potential evidence overlooked in the selection and validation stages of the
investigation process shown in Figure 1.
Table 1 provides a small example of the proposed checklist based on the hypothetical case. A set of categories “subject”, “assertion”, several “prompts” and “known issues” – guides the legal practitioner to identify and
locate corroboratory evidence to validate each piece of evidence. Using the example of the hypothetical case,
the email is the subject of the validation process and the occurrence of file deletion, the assertion. The first
prompt provides the enquirer with a list of file locations to commence a search. The second prompt suggests
what tool should be used, such as the email application, and the third prompt provides a range of information
that should be sought with the tools suggested and at the location suggested. The fourth prompt suggests
conditions that could assist in validating the assertion.
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Assertion

[Email
was]
Copied

Email

Prompt

Prompt

Prompt

Prompt

Where to search?

How to search?

What to seek?

How do we know if
: Yes / No /
Unclear?

Application

Search tool

Metadata

Date/time match
No date/time match

Known issues

Metadata can
be falsified

Date/time missing
[Email
was]
Deleted

Email trash

Application

Metadata

Date/time match
No date/time match
Date/time missing

Recycle bin

Windows
Explorer

File contents

Intact
Not evident

or

Retention
affected by
storage
limitations
File can be
overwritten

Part missing

Forensic tool

Intact
Not evident

File can be
unrecoverable

Part missing
File header

Intact
Not evident

File can be
overwritten

Part missing
Intact
Not evident

File can be
unrecoverable

Part missing
Drafts

- ditto -

- ditto -

- ditto -

- ditto -

Table 1. Checklist entries showing prompts to assist in validating an email file deletion
In this sample, the assertion can be checked against the metadata of the email file to compare the data and time
available with the known time of the offence. This prompt provides “Date/time match”, “No date/time match”,
and “Date/time missing”. The final column “Known issues”, provides supplementary information about
previously identified validation issues.
Subject

Assertion

Deleted
email
metadata

Falsified

Prompt

Prompt

Prompt

Prompt

Where to
search?

How to search?

What to seek?

How do we know if
: Yes / No /
Unclear?

Inside the file
properties table

Application

Authorship
details

Present
Not present
Cannot resolve if
present

The hard drive

File attribute
modification
application
Forensic tool

Inside the
application

Traces of the
application

Known issues

Not possible to
detect manual
alteration of
the properties
using the
parent
application

No traces of the
application
Unclear if traces of
the application

Other copies of
the file

Metadata match
Metadata mismatch
Metadata irregular

Table 2. Checklist entries relevant to the metadata of an email file.
The information supplied through Table 1 may still be an inconclusive result but will provide additional prompts
to direct further searches in a different part of the checklist to locate more information to assist the validation

process. This is shown in Table 2 where a series of further prompts point to possible scenarios that may relate to
the deleted email file. The validation prompt offers an extra suite of prompts such as “metadata mismatch” or
“traces” and so forth.
Although it is outside the scope of this paper to develop fully the checklist we plan further research to test its
feasibility and usefulness to the legal practitioner and possibly investigators in validating digital evidence.
Formulating a database of digital evidence properties that can link back to the evidence in a given context would
be especially useful in enhancing understanding of the evidence validation in a wide range of cases.

CONCLUSION
We have presented a practical process that can assist legal practitioners in validating digital evidence through a
process of guided questioning. We suggested that the process can be supported by a checklist of appropriate
prompts, and presented a hypothetical example of how the questioning and checklist of prompts might be used
in practice. We suggest that such a process could be of great value to legal practitioners as it makes explicit a
vital stage in the investigation of digital evidence that can easily be overlooked or underestimated. Further
research is planned to progress the checklist further, with the aim of developing a generic model based on an
ontology of the digital evidence field. Research will also focus on developing an appropriate representation for
the process, so that it is usable as a practical tool for legal practitioners in validating digital evidence.
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